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The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in Russia. 
This issue is of major interest in order to understand the causes of financial underdevelop-
ment and the effects of corruption in Russia. We use regional measures of corruption and 
bank-level data to perform this investigation. Our main estimations show that corruption 
hampers bank lending in Russia. We investigate whether this negative role of corruption is 
influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion, but find no effect. The detrimental effect of 
corruption is only observed for loans to households and firms, in opposition to loans to 
government. Additional controls confirm the detrimental impact of corruption on bank 
lending. Therefore, our results provide motivations to fight corruption to favor bank lend-
ing in Russia. 
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 Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan korruption vaikutusta pankkien luotonantoon Venäjällä. 
Tämä aihe auttaa ymmärtämään Venäjän rahoitusjärjestelmän hidasta kehitystä sekä kor-
ruption vaikutusta maassa. Tutkimuksessa käytetään aluetilastoja pankkien luotonannosta 
ja korruptiosta. Päätulos on, että korruptio vähentää pankkien luotonantoa Venäjällä. Työs-
sä tutkitaan myös, riippuuko korruption negatiivinen vaikutus lainanantoon pankkien ris-
kiaversion asteesta, mutta näin ei näytä olevan. Korruption lainanantoa vähentävä vaikutus 
ilmenee ainoastaan lainoissa kotitalouksille ja yrityksille, ei valtiolle annetuissa lainoissa. 
Kontrollimuuttujien käyttäminen ei muuta korruption ja lainanannon välistä yhteyttä. Tu-
losten mukaan korruption vastainen taistelu lisäisi pankkien lainanantoa Venäjällä. 
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 “The doctor keeps talking, talking but his eyes keep darting,  
darting to my fist – wondering if I’ll give him a crisp blue-colored bill.” 
 
Anton Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard, 1904 (cited by Gradirovski  




1  Introduction 
 
The evidence of corruption in Russia is difficult to refute. Transparency International’s 
2007 Corruption Perception Index ranked Russia 143
rd out of the 179 countries surveyed, 
making it the second-most corrupt country in Europe after Belarus. Confounding the scho-
larly intuition that the corruption that has plagued Russia since Chekhov’s time should de-
cline with economic prosperity (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000), it appears instead that cor-
ruption has thrived unabated during Russia’s recent economic resurgence.
2 Levin and Sata-
rov (2000, p.113) conclude that corruption in Russia is an endemic phenomenon that has 
“become a commonplace theme in discussions of the Russian economy.” 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in 
Russia. Our hypothesis is that a high level of corruption discourages banks from engaging 
in lending. Greater corruption adds to uncertainty of judicial decisions for banks, as they 
cannot count on the courts to enforce damages recoveries for losses or deficiency judg-
ments against defaulting debtors, and consequently banks are expected to refrain from 
lending. However corruption is not limited to the misuse of public office as underlined by 
its common definition provided by Transparency International: “the misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain”. It can also take place in lending through bribes given to bank offi-
cials to receive a loan, as observed by Levin and Satarov (2000) in Russia. 
While corruption in courts is expected to have a negative impact on bank lending, 
the role of corruption in lending is not straightforward. It can be considered as a financing 
obstacle, as it acts as a tax that increases the cost of the loan to the borrower. However, 
while the latter argument assumes that the bribe is required by the bank official, the bor-




2 Russia’s TI Corruption Perception Index scores were the same in 2001 and 2007. Laurent Weill  
 




                                                
Furthermore, the impact of corruption on bank lending may vary with the type of borro-
wers, and corruption may consequently influence the breakdown of bank lending between 
types of borrowers. Thus, we might well ask whether corruption, associated with ill-
functioning institutions, exerts the same influence on bank lending to government entities 
as to other borrowers. We examine these issues using data on corruption in 40 Russian re-
gions from the Transparency International (TI) and Information for Democracy Foundation 
(INDEM) survey conducted in 2002. Detailed data on banks are drawn from the Interfax 
database. 
Our work then contributes to understand the causes of financial development and of 
the effects of corruption in Russia, i.e. both fundamental issues for the economic develop-
ment of the country. First, bank lending remains stunningly low with a ratio of domestic 
credit to GDP equal to 25.7% in 2005, compared to a world average of 55.8% (EBRD, 
2006). Given that a positive relationship between bank lending and growth has long been 
noted in the literature (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000), the 
need for investigating the determinants of bank lending in Russia is self-evident. We ask, 
therefore, how endemic corruption has played a role in stunting development of bank lend-
ing in Russia. 
Second, as notably observed by Shleifer and Treisman (2000), there is a commonly 
accepted view that corruption hampers economic development in Russia, which relies on 
the cross-country studies showing the detrimental effects of corruption on economic devel-
opment (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Yet this consensus has emerged in the ab-
sence of studies that actually establish and specify the detriments of corruption in Russia
3. 
Moreover, economic boom in the midst of persistent corruption calls into question directly 
the notion that corruption per se constitutes an obstacle to economic growth. Thus, closer 
scrutiny is needed to assess the detrimental economic effects of corruption in Russia. 
Next to its relevance for Russia, this study brings also significant insights for sev-
eral strands of literature. By focusing on the impact on bank lending, it analyzes an unex-
plored effect of corruption. Indeed, in spite of the growing literature on corruption, no 
study has ever studied the impact of corruption on bank lending. This work also relates to 
studies investigating the role of legal institutions on the size of credit markets at the macro 
level (La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007) and the micro level 
(Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2006). While these papers point out the role of legal origin, 
 
3 The sole exception to our knowledge is the study of Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez-Vega (2001), which 
shows the negative impact of corruption on growth of microenterprises in Russia. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




creditor rights, and law enforcement, we extend this literature by investigating the role of 
corruption and by proceeding to a single-country study. 
This national framework is of utmost interest to appraise the economic effects of 
corruption on bank lending. A cross-country analysis suffers from the drawback of mixing 
the effects of corruption with country-level variables such as legal origin, laws in the 
books, or culture. Indeed several studies have shown the relationship between corruption 
and legal variables (La Porta et al., 1997) and the role of culture on corruption (Treisman, 
2000). The use of a national framework allows for teasing out of specific economic effects 
of corruption on bank lending. Indeed, Svensson (2005) discusses the econometric prob-
lems in cross-country analyses of the effects of corruption resulting from omitted variables. 
Our single-country framework is not subject to these constraints. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents evidence and lit-
erature on corruption in Russia. Section III develops the arguments on the role of corrup-
tion on bank lending. Section IV presents data and variables. In section V, we develop our 
results. We finally provide some concluding remarks in section VI. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents evidence 
and literature on corruption in Russia. Section III develops the arguments on the role of 
corruption on bank lending. Section IV presents the data and variables and section V con-
siders the results. Concluding remarks appear in section VI. 
 
 
2  Corruption in Russia 
 
In reviewing corruption of the judiciary, Blass (2007) describes the Russian court system 
as a “supine, underpaid judiciary, ill-equipped to withstand corruptive practices and the 
influence of economic or political interests.” While this situation appears to be changing 
slowly, thanks in part to reforms implemented during Putin’s presidency (e.g. higher sala-
ries for judges), INDEM figures suggest corruption of the courts remains high. The per-
ceived average cost of obtaining justice in a Russian court was 9,570 rubles (US$ 358) in 
2005. Furthermore, the share of citizens encountering corruption situations when seeking 
justice through the courts was 39.5% (INDEM, 2005). In an interview with Izvestia (Octo-Laurent Weill  
 




ber 25, 2004), Constitutional Court chairman, Valery Zorkin, bleakly observed, “Bribe-
taking in the courts has become one of the biggest corruption markets in Russia.” 
Corruption in bank lending entered the public consciousness with the well-publicized Sep-
tember 2006 assassination of Andrei Kozlov, the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank 
of Russia in charge of fighting against corruption, money laundering and other abuses in 
the Russian banking industry. Corruption in lending practices appears to be supported by a 
wide array of elements. Levin and Satarov (2000) describe how in the 1990s borrowers 
gave envelopes filled with cash to bank officials and then present the figures for criminal 
cases actually prosecuted against employees of Russian banks. In April 2008, the Central 
Bank of Russia took a new tack in fighting corruption in lending by publishing a blacklist 
of bank managers sued for criminal account and civil liability (Kommersant, April 2, 
2008). The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank, carried out 
between end-1998 and mid-2000, also dealt with this form of corruption in its cross-
country survey of firm managers on the possible role of corruption of bank officials as an 
obstacle for the growth of business. Our computations, which are based on the WBES 
sample of 363 Russian firm managers, show that 26.72% considered that corruption of 
bank officials to be a major or moderate obstacle to business at the time of the survey. It 
must be stressed that these figures are similar to those observed in other regions of the 
world. Indeed, Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2004) use the survey findings to show that 20–
30% of firms in non-OECD countries consider corruption of bank officials a major or 
moderate obstacle to their businesses. 
Given the strong evidence of corruption’s significance in Russia, the dearth of aca-
demic papers on the topic is somewhat surprising. Levin and Satarov (2000) lay out the 
different forms of corruption manifested in the 1990s, underlining the critical role of insti-
tutions in their persistence. Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez-Vega (2001) investigate of the 
role of corruption in the growth of microenterprises. Their ground-breaking work is based 
on a survey of 304 microenterprises in Samara area in which managers were asked to pro-
vide information on the characteristics of their firm and on their perception of corruption. 
They find that firms were not affected uniformly by corruption (i.e. larger and more suc-
cessful companies were more tolerant of bribery) and that corruption was detrimental to 
corporate growth. 
Dininio and Orttung (2005) investigate the determinants of corruption by using a 
measure of corruption based on the amount of bribes from the TI/INDEM dataset. They BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
test several theories for the variation in corruption across Russian regions. This involves 
considering such variables as economic development, presence of natural resources, insti-
tutions, and size of government measured by the number of bureaucrats. Only two vari-
ables, per capita income and the number of bureaucrats, are found significant in explaining 
corruption. Mokhtari and Grafova (2007) show a negative association between corruption 
among tax office employees and tax collection in Russia. They develop a model on the mo-
tivation of corrupt tax inspectors to accept bribes. They empirically test this prediction and 
show that increasing the number of tax inspection employees reduces per capita tax collec-
tion. 
In their description of the Russian transition, Shleifer and Treisman (2000) use a 
cross-country analysis on the determinants of corruption from Treisman (2000) to com-
ment the causes of corruption in Russia.
4 They observe that per capita income, federal 
structure, and the lack of exposure to democracy and free trade best explain corruption in 
Russia. From this, they infer cultural and historical factors are not relevant to explaining 
the extent of corruption in Russia. In other words, they do not see corruption in Russia as 
intrinsic to the country. These observations lead them to conclude that corruption “is likely 
to diminish – though slowly – the longer the country remains democratic and open to 
trade,” and also that it “should fall if economic growth returns” (p.104). Regarding the 
consequences of corruption, they claim corruption “is not a sufficient explanation for the 
country’s failure to grow” (p.105), and give several historical examples of rapid growth in 
corrupt countries. Their argument is somewhat finessed: they do not say corruption is not 
detrimental to growth, rather they suggest that the detrimental effects of corruption may 
sometimes be insufficient to overwhelm positive influences from other determinants of 
growth. 
In summary, we note that while the presence of corruption in courts and lending in 
Russia is acknowledged, there has been little investigation into the economic consequences 
of this phenomenon. By analyzing the role of corruption on bank lending in Russia, we 




4 See also Goel and Nelson (2008) and Goel (2008) for cross-country investigations on the causes of corrup-
tion. Laurent Weill  
 




                                                
3  Linkages of corruption and bank lending 
 
This section presents the elements from the literature on the effects of corruption on bank 
lending. The key argument that corruption should be expected to hamper bank lending is 
based on the law and finance theory pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997). Legal institutions 
protecting banks and enforcing contracts are likely to encourage greater bank lending by 
increasing the willingness of banks to grant loans. In the case of borrower default, the bank 
may wish to force repayment, to grab collateral or even in some cases to take control of the 
borrower in case of a corporate loan. Therefore, the institutions that empower the bank to 
proceed to these actions exert an influence on its lending behavior. As corruption adds to 
uncertainty for banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers, it diminishes the 
willingness of banks to grant loans. 
Empirical evidence supports the role of laws on the books and law enforcement on 
bank lending. While La Porta et al. (1997) observe that better legal protection for creditors 
contributes to larger debt markets, Levine (1998, 1999) and Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer (2007) show that better legal protection for lenders is associated with increased 
levels of bank lending. In a cross-country investigation at the loan level, Qian and Strahan 
(2007) provide support for this view with the finding that stronger protection for borrowers 
on the books depresses lending. 
The arguments above share a common presumption that corruption hampers bank 
lending. But might not corruption in lending be beneficial in some cases? For example, 
when the borrower bribes the bank official to enhance his chances of obtaining a loan, cor-
ruption encourages banks to lend. Thus, corruption greases the wheels of the banking in-
dustry, or as the Russians say, “one hand washes the other.”
5 
A theoretical argument can also be advanced to support this positive impact of cor-
ruption in lending. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that adverse selection, resulting 
from ex ante information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower, causes credit ra-
tioning (i.e. loan applications from borrowers willing to pay more than the loan rate 
charged by the bank are rejected). The bank is motivated to do so to avoid adverse selec-
tion that results in attracting only bad borrowers. Nevertheless, the existence of credit ra-
tioning suggests that some borrowers are willing to pay more than the official loan rate to 
 
5 Bardhan (1997, p.1323) points out the terminological distinction in Russian between “mzdoimstvo, taking a 
remuneration to do what you are supposed to do anyway, and likhoimstvo, taking a remuneration for what 
you are not supposed to do.” BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
obtain credit. As a consequence, they have incentive to bribe bank officials to obtain the 
loan. 
Several transition country scholars note the role of corruption in encouraging bank 
lending. In Russia, Levin and Satarov (2000, p. 115) observe that corruption can take place 
through “providing a credit from a commercial bank in exchange for a bribe.” In the Czech 
Republic, Lizal and Kocenda (2001, p.150) mention that “in the banking sector, corruption 
is associated with the provision of loans for unreasonable or even non-existent projects.” 
This remark is in line with the view that some loans may have been granted following 
bribes given by borrowers to obtain a loan. Furthermore, our own computations on the 
WBES dataset for Russia show that 58.13% of Russian firm managers did not perceive 
corruption of bank officials as an obstacle to the growth of their business.  
From an empirical perspective, the only paper to our knowledge providing estima-
tions on the role of corruption on bank lending is the investigation of Detragiache, Tressel 
and Gupta (2008) into the role of foreign bank penetration on bank credit. This work con-
siders corruption as a control variable and finds a negative association with bank credit. 
 
 
4  Data and variables 
 
We describe our measures of corruption and our bank-level variables in turn. Table 1 re-
ports descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 
4.1  Corruption data 
 
To measure corruption, we use the survey conducted by Transparency International and the 
Information for Democracy Foundation to measure differences in corruption levels across 
Russia in 2002.
6 The two organizations gathered during July and August 2002 comments 
from 5,666 individuals and 1,838 entrepreneurs representing small and medium-sized 
businesses in 40 Russian regions. The survey includes questions related to both perceptions 
and personal experiences with corruption. The dataset is unique in that it provides corrup-
tion measures at the regional level for Russia. 
 
6 Data and description of the survey can be downloaded from www.transparency.org.ru/proj_index.asp.  Laurent Weill  
 




                                                
We use two measures from this survey to assess corruption in our estimations: the 
integral index for the perception of corruption (Perception), and the integral index for the 
amount of corruption (Amount), which asks people how much money they give in bribes. 
Both indices assign 0 to the region with the smallest level of corruption and 1 to the region 
with the highest level of corruption. 
The measure for perception is consistent with the Transparency International CPI 
score, which is widely used in cross-country comparisons and empirical studies (e.g. 
Lambsdorff, 2003; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). At first glance the measure based on amount 
of bribes seems to have greater objectivity, since it is based on experience and potentially 
could provide more reliable information than mere perception. Unfortunately, there is no 
way to verify the accuracy of the amounts reported. The initiators of the project note that 
while “assessment questions do not trouble respondents, who eagerly answer such ques-
tions (…), respondents hesitate to answer questions on corruption practices” (Transparency 
International and INDEM, 2002, p.1). Moreover, while both measures of corruption have a 
positive and significant correlation, the coefficient of correlation is not as high as one 
might expect (0.33). As the indices complement each other, we test both in our investiga-
tion. 
The survey contains information on corruption for 40 of Russia’s 89 regions. This 
incomplete coverage is not a major limitation for our study, as these 40 regions included 
82.5% of Russian banks. Measures of corruption by region are presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.2  Bank-level data and control variables 
 
We obtain quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency Interfax. As we 
have information on corruption for Russian regions only for 2002, we use the four quarters 
of 2002 for the sample period. Our sample is composed of 3,825 observations for 1,009 
banks. The Russian banking industry is particularly fragmented, with 1,329 banks in 2002 
(EBRD, 2006), of which 37 were foreign-owned and 27 were publicly-owned.7 
Following Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2006), bank lending is measured by the 
logarithm of total customer loans, i.e. all loans except interbank loans. We take the impact 
of changes in law on the lending behavior, measured by this variable, in transition coun-
tries. We use bank-level control variables to take bank characteristics into account. The 
 
7 Descriptions of the Russian banking industry can be found in Vernikov (2007), Karas, Schoors and Weill 
(2008), and Barisitz (2008). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits to Assets) is controlled in the estimations, as 
sources of financing can influence the lending behavior of the bank. We also account for 
the size of the bank (Size), measured by the logarithm of total assets as the activities of 
small and big banks may differ. Age is the number of quarters since the creation of the 
bank. Ownership is controlled with dummy variables for public ownership (Public) and 
foreign ownership (Foreign). 
We also use two region-level variables to control for the environment. Bank Con-
centration is the Herfindahl index of regional bank concentration for loans,
8 and computed 
from our dataset. Per Capita Income is the logarithm of Gross Regional product per capita, 
controlling for economic development. Data are obtained from the Federal State Statistics 




5  Results 
 
This section presents our results for the impact of corruption on bank lending. We start 
with the main estimations, and then look at whether bank risk aversion influences the rela-
tionship between corruption and bank lending. Next, we consider corruption effects for va-
rious borrower groups. Finally, we perform some robustness check tests. 
 
5.1  Main estimations 
 
We perform regressions of bank lending on a set of variables, including a measure of cor-
ruption. We use alternatively both measures of corruption and two combinations of control 
variables (with and without the region-level control variables) to check the sensitivity of 
the results. These results are displayed in Table 2. 
The key finding is the negative coefficient of Corruption, which is significant at 1% 
level. This result is observed when the corruption variable is Perception or Amount, which 
shows that it is not dependent on the measure of corruption. It is robust to the set of control 
 
8 Results are similar with the Herfindahl index for assets.  Laurent Weill  
 




variables as the presence of the regional control variables does not affect this finding. The 
indication is that corruption hampers bank lending. 
Most control variables are significant. The positive sign for Size results most likely 
from the fact that bigger banks grant more loans. Deposits to Assets has a negative sign, 
suggesting that banks relying more on deposits are not as aggressive at lending. Age is 
positive in all estimations, but only significant when regional variables are not included. 
This tends to show that older banks lend more, which is in line with the role of long-term 
relationships between banks and borrowers to reduce information asymmetries in the loan 
relationship (Sharpe, 1990). The dummy variables for foreign and public ownership are 
both significantly negative. Controlling for the size and age of the bank, this finding indi-
cates foreign and public banks lend less than domestic private banks. 
Bank Concentration is not significant, suggesting that bank lending is not influ-
enced by the degree of concentration of the banking industry. Finally, Per Capita Income is 
significantly negative, which is in line with the view that greater economic development 
negatively influences bank lending. This may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, given 
that the literature on the finance-growth nexus generally finds a positive association be-
tween economic and financial development (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998). Yet this de-
pressing effect on lending is widely observed at the country level when we perform bank-
level estimations. Of course, this finding could be intrinsic to Russia, making it hard to 
compare against studies elsewhere. To our best knowledge, no other studies have investi-
gated the finance-growth nexus on Russian data. 
 
5.2  The impact of risk aversion of banks 
 
Even if corruption hampers bank lending, it is not clear that this effect is sensitive to the 
degree of bank risk aversion. Indeed corruption may be initiated by the borrower willing to 
enhance his chances to obtain a loan. One would expect to find this behavior more com-
monplace when banks display greater risk aversion, i.e. are more reluctant to grant loans. 
Indeed this reluctance diminishes the chances of obtaining a loan for the borrower and mo-
tivates him to offer a bribe. Therefore, even if the overall effect of corruption on bank len-
ding is detrimental, we need to determine whether it is weakened by the presence of greater 
risk aversion on the part of banks. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




To investigate this, we turn to a second set of estimations of the risk aversion of 
banks. Risk aversion is measured by the difference between the value of the capital ade-
quacy ratio (N1) and the requirement for this ratio. Capital adequacy ratio is defined as the 
ratio of the bank’s equity capital to the overall risk-weighted assets minus the sum of the 
reserves created for depreciation of securities and possible losses. The minimum level of 
this ratio required by banking regulation depends on the amount of the bank’s equity: in 
2002, the requirements were 10% for banks with equity above €5 million, and 11% for 
other banks. While a few studies use the ratio of equity to total assets as a measure of risk 
aversion of banks (e.g. Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), we believe our measure 
of risk aversion is better as it takes into account the capital held in excess of regulatory 
capital and the different risk-weighted assets. 
We add a variable for bank risk aversion and an interaction term between corrup-
tion and the degree of bank risk aversion. The overall coefficient of the corruption index is 
the sum of the coefficient for Corruption and the coefficient for the interaction term Cor-
ruption × Risk Aversion multiplied by the value of Risk Aversion. Thus, if the negative 
effect of corruption on bank lending is weakened in the presence of greater bank risk aver-
sion, we expect that when Corruption is significantly negative, the interaction term Corrup-
tion × Risk Aversion is significantly positive. 
The results of these estimations are displayed in Table 3. Note that the coefficient 
of Corruption is negative even if it only remains significant when the measure of corrup-
tion based on amount is used. Furthermore, the coefficient of Risk Aversion is significantly 
negative, which jives with the intuitive view that risk-averse banks lend less. We do not, 
however, find that the interaction term Corruption × Risk Aversion is significantly posi-
tive. This finding supports the view that the negative impact of corruption on bank lending 
is not influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion. In other words, the hypothesis that 
corruption may be less detrimental on bank lending by relaxing the reluctance of banks to 
grant loans is not supported. 
 
 Laurent Weill  
 




5.3  Estimations by category of loans 
 
We now ask whether corruption may affect different groups of borrowers differently, and 
even favor some borrowers over others. 
Specifically, we test the assumption that corruption is less detrimental for lending 
to government entities than other borrowers. This assumption is based on two mechanisms.  
First, corruption should exert an impact on bank lending by increasing the uncer-
tainty of banks about enforcing their claims against defaulting borrowers. Therefore, this 
effect is expected to play a greater role for borrowers when the degree of information 
asymmetries is higher from the bank’s perspective. As observed by Haselmann and 
Wachtel (2006), these asymmetries should be weaker when banks lend money to govern-
ment entities than to other borrowers as the ability of the government to tax means a lower 
default risk, which, in turn, leads to lower requirements for the bank to gather information. 
Thus, we expect a weaker detrimental effect of corruption on bank lending to government 
entities.  
Second, corruption is associated with institutional inefficiencies, so we ask whether 
corruption also exerts an impact on loans to government entities through public pressure to 
satisfy their financing needs. Our dataset allows such investigation as it includes informa-
tion on loans by borrower type: households, firms, and government (i.e. federal, regional 
and local entities). 
We rerun our estimations considering the logarithm of each category of loans as the 
explained variable. The results appear in Table 4 (Perception corruption variable) and Ta-
ble 5 (Amount corruption variable). We observe the coefficient for Corruption is negative 
in estimations explaining loans to households and loans to firms, with a significant sign in 
most cases. This indicates corruption hampers bank lending to households and to firms. 
The most striking finding here concerns the positive coefficient for Corruption in estima-
tions explaining loans to government, which is significant in most cases. It suggests cor-
ruption favors bank lending to government, and is thus not detrimental for all borrowers. 
As mentioned above, lower information asymmetries when lending to government entities 
may explain why these borrowers are less affected by corruption, but it does not explain 
the positive impact. One possibility is that ill-functioning institutions with dishonest civil 
servants are extorting money from banks. In any case, the positive impact of corruption on 
bank lending to government should not be interpreted as a benefit. Unlike bank lending as 
a whole, bank lending to government does not favor economic development. Further, it is BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




reasonable to postulate that increased bank lending to government entities diverts lending 
resources away from more appropriate borrowers in terms of economic development. 
For the rest, we observe similar results for the control variables in most cases with 
two interesting exceptions. Age is significantly negative when loans to government are ex-
plained, suggesting that younger banks grant more loans to government. Moreover, the 
share of deposits to assets, which was significantly negative in our main estimations, is dif-
ferently connected to each category of loans: negatively significant for loans to firms, posi-
tively significant for loans to households, and not significant for loans to government. As 
loans to firms represent the majority of customer loans (88.76%), our result from the main 
initial estimations was driven by these loans. However, we observe that banks that rely 
more on deposits tend to lend more loans to households. This is an intuitive result, as these 
banks are expected to have more households in their client base. 
 
5.4  Robustness checks 
 
Having tested the robustness of this result to alternative measures of corruption and differ-
ent sets of control variables, we now check the robustness of this finding in other ways. 
We use an alternative variable to measure the extent to which banks grant credit: 
the share of loans in total assets. This considers the importance of lending in the activities 
of the bank, and takes the size of the bank into account. The estimations are given in Table 
6. Note that the coefficient of Corruption remains significantly negative while the control 
variables are unaffected. 
Another potential distortion in the results could come from the fact that about half 
of the banks surveyed were located in the Moscow region and thus makes the level of cor-
ruption in the Moscow region determinative. We revise our estimations by considering 
only banks outside the Moscow region to check whether our findings are preserved. Re-
sults presented in Table 7 show that the detrimental effect of corruption on bank lending is 
not affected by the restriction of the sample to non-Moscow banks, as Corruption remains 
significantly negative. We observe that the coefficients of control variables are slightly af-
fected with notably a non-significant coefficient for foreign ownership, which can be ex-
plained by the small number of foreign banks outside the Moscow region. 
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6  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we examined the role of corruption on bank lending in Russia using regional 
data for corruption and bank-level data for lending. Overall, we found corruption diminish-
es bank lending. Further, the detrimental effect is not weakened when the risk aversion of 
banks is taken into account. Estimations by type of borrowers showed that corruption fa-
vors lending to government entities over lending to households and firms. This latter find-
ing is not necessarily good news as it may indicate institutional susceptibility to public 
pressure to grant bank loans and divert bank lending away from more appropriate and eco-
nomically beneficial uses. 
Our overall conclusion is that corruption is detrimental to bank lending in Russia. 
Corruption adds to uncertainty for banks; it reduces their trust in courts and acts as tax on 
loans for borrowers. These findings provide a better understanding of the causes of Rus-
sia’s financial underdevelopment and the consequences of corruption. As bank credit has 
generally been shown to favor growth, these results should give Russian officials an eco-
nomic incentive to fight corruption actively rather than give in to the widely held view that 
economic growth in itself will lead to lower corruption levels. 
Our analysis could be extended in a number of ways. For example, information on 
the connections between banks and borrowers could, in the line of Khwaja and Mian 
(2005), be gathered to investigate the presence of connected lending in Russia. Studies 
could also be performed for other countries to establish whether the effects of corruption 
on bank lending are not exclusive to Russia. 
Future corruption trends in Russia are, of course, hard to predict. On the optimistic 
side, Shleifer and Treisman (2000, 2004) do not find corruption in Russia a specific char-
acteristic of this “normal country,” giving hope that corruption will soon begin to diminish, 
even if the trend severely lags economic development. INDEM experts make the more pes-
simistic assertion that “Russia needs 40 years of meticulous work to reach the corruption 
level in Portugal or 100 years to come up with corruption statistics in Sweden” (Kommer-
sant, October 31, 2006). Sadly, recent evidence of enduring high levels of corruption in 
this fast-growing country and polls showing a large proportion of Russians still consider 
various forms of bribery as morally acceptable (e.g. 2006 Gallup poll mentioned by Gradi-
rovski and Esipova, 2006) tend to support a bleak outlook. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 1 Variables and summary statistics 
 
Means and standard deviations for variables used in subsequent estimations. Sources: 
TI/INDEM survey for Perception and Amount; Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) 
for Per Capita Income; own computations with Interfax database for Bank Concentration; 
and Interfax database for all bank-level variables. 
 
 
Variable Description  N  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Perception  Integral index for the perception of cor-
ruption from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most 
corrupt) 
3,825 0.6241  0.1429 
Amount  Integral index for the amount of corrup-
tion from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most 
corrupt) 
3,825 0.7213  0.2601 
Loans  Logarithm of total customer loans, i.e. 
the sum of loans to households, firms, 
and government (in millions of rubles) 
3,825 5.1038  1.8723 
Loans to Assets 
 
Ratio of loans to total assets 3,825  0.5203  0.2092 
Risk Aversion  Difference between the capital adequacy 
ratio (N1) and the minimum required 
ratio 
3,825 29.29  23.41 
Size 
 
Logarithm of total assets (in millions of 
rubles) 
3,825 5.9039  1.7221 
Deposits to Assets 
 
Ratio of deposits to total assets  3,825  0.5698  0.2068 
Age 
 
Age (in quarters)  3,825  37.72  9.45 
Public  Dummy variable; equals one if the bank 
is publicly-owned 
3,825 0.0167  0.1283 
Foreign  Dummy variable; equals one if the bank 
is foreign-owned 
3,825 0.0238  0.1524 
Bank Concentration  Herfindahl index of regional bank con-
centration for loans 
3,825 0.1411  0.1692 
Per Capita Income  Gross regional product per capita (in 
thousands of rubles) 
3,825 11.5304 0.6546 
Loans to Households  Logarithm of loans to households (in 
millions of rubles) 
3,573 2.0847  1.9656 
Loans to Firms  Logarithm of loans to firms (in millions 
of rubles) 
3,809 4.9752  1.9474 
Loans to Govern-
ment 
Logarithm of loans to government (in 
millions of rubles) 
694 1.9199 2.8126 
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Table 2 Main estimations 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 
1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters 
are included in the regressions, but not reported here. 
 
 
 Corruption  variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 





































































Adjusted  R²  0.8618 0.8653 0.8636 0.8653 
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Table 3 Estimations with risk aversion variable 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 
1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters 
are included in the regressions, but not reported here. 
 
 
 Corruption  variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 























































































Adjusted  R²  0.8702 0.8724 0.8710 0.8724 
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Table 4 Estimations by category of loans with Perception variable 
 
 
OLS regressions. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table reports coefficients with 
t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 










Loans to Firms  Loans to Government 























































































































Adjusted R²  0.419
5 
0.4202  0.8586 0.8618 0.3127  0.3313 
N  3573  3573  3809 3809 694  694 
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Table 5 Estimations by category of loans with amount variable 
 
 
OLS regressions. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table reports coefficients with 
t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 




 Dependent  Variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Loans to Households  Loans to Firms  Loans to Government 



















































































































Adjusted  R²  0.4183  0.4201  0.8601 0.8617 0.3143  0.3418 
N  3573  3573  3809 3809 694  694 
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Table 6 Robustness Check: Alternative measure of bank lending 
 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans to Assets. Definitions of variables ap-
pear in table 1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables 
for quarters are included in the regressions, but not reported here. 
 
 
 Corruption  variable 







































































Adjusted  R²  0.1048 0.1261 0.1163 0.1256 
N  3825 3825 3825 3825 
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Table 7 Robustness check: Estimations for non-Moscow banks 
 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 
1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters 
are included in the regressions, but not reported here. 
 
 
 Corruption  variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 

































































Adjusted  R²  0.9277 0.9277 0.9274 0.9273 
N  1617 1617 1617 1617 
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Table A1 Measures of corruption by region 
 
This table displays integral indices for perception of corruption and for amount of corruption.  
 
Region  Index for Perception  Index for Amount 
Altai Krai  0.551  0.721 
Amur Oblast  0.633  0.299 
Arkhangelsk Oblast  0.128  0.068 
Bashkortostan 0.000  0.114 
Belgorod Oblast  0.435  0.403 
Chelyabinsk Oblast  0.556  0.853 
Karelia 0.864  0.000 
Kemerovo Oblast  0.269  0.664 
Khabarovsk Krai  0.644  0.782 
Krasnodar Krai  1.000  0.681 
Krasnoyarsk Krai  0.331  0.117 
Kurgansk Oblast 0.658  0.253 
Leningrad Oblast  0.530  0.340 
Moscow 0.634  0.864 
Moscow Oblast  0.754  1.000 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast  0.712  0.929 
Novgorod Oblast  0.658  0.181 
Novosibirsk Oblast  0.643  0.275 
Omsk Oblast  0.542  0.074 
Perm Oblast  0.470  0.115 
Primorski Krai  0.868  0.201 
Pskov Oblast  0.595  0.542 
Rostov Oblast  0.747  0.753 
Ryazan Oblast  0.558  0.395 
Samara Oblast  0.731  0.200 
Saratov Oblast  0.913  0.867 
St. Petersburg  0.412  0.843 
Stavropol Krai  0.707  0.501 
Sverdlovsk Oblast  0.582  0.683 
Tambov Oblast  0.489  0.580 
Tatarstan 0.658  0.245 
Tula Oblast  0.486  0.554 
Tumen Oblast  0.283  0.033 
Tver Oblast  0.629  0.160 
Udmurtia 0.872  0.333 
Ulyanovsk Oblast  0.580  0.552 
Volgograd Oblast  0.803  0.801 
Voronezh Oblast  0.626  0.390 
Yaroslavl Oblast  0.295  0.010 
Тomsk Oblast  0.645  0.352 
Source: TI/INDEM survey. 
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